Just a few weeks before Hamas launched the deadly October 7 attacks on Israel, the head of Mossad arrived in Doha, Qatar, to meet with Qatari officials. For years, the Qatari government had been sending millions of dollars a month to the Gaza Strip, money that helped prop up the Hamas government there. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu not only tolerated these payments, but had encouraged them. During his meetings in September with Qatari officials, Mossad director David Barnea was asked a question that was not on the agenda, according to several people familiar with the secret discussions: Did Israel want the payments to continue? The Netanyahu government had recently decided to continue the policy, so Barnea said yes. The Israeli government still welcomed the money from Doha. Allowing the payments – billions of dollars over the course of about a decade – was a gamble by Netanyahu that a steady flow of money would maintain peace in Gaza (which would later be the starting point of the October 7 attacks), and keep Hamas focused on governing, not fighting. The Qatari payments, though apparently secret, have been widely known and discussed in the Israeli media for years. Netanyahu’s critics dismiss them as part of a “buying calm” strategy, and the policy is under intense scrutiny following the attacks. Netanyahu has responded to those criticisms by calling the insinuation that he tried to empower Hamas “ridiculous.” In interviews with more than two dozen Israeli, American, and Qatari officials and former officials, as well as officials from other Middle Eastern governments, The New York Times discovered new details about the origins of the policy, the controversies that erupted within the Israeli government, and how far Netanyahu went to shield the Qataris from criticism and maintain the flow of money. The payments were part of a series of decisions by Israeli political leaders, military officials, and intelligence officials, all based on the fundamentally mistaken perception that Hamas was neither interested in nor capable of carrying out a large-scale attack. The Times previously reported on intelligence failures and other erroneous assumptions that preceded the attacks. Even after the Israeli military obtained battle plans for a Hamas invasion and analysts observed considerable terrorist exercises just across the border in Gaza, the payments continued. For years, Israeli intelligence agents even escorted a Qatari official to Gaza, where he distributed money from suitcases filled with millions of dollars. The Qatari money had humanitarian goals, such as paying government salaries in Gaza and buying fuel to keep a power plant running. But there are Israeli intelligence officials who now believe the money played a role in the success of the October 7 attacks, if only because the donations allowed Hamas to divert part of its own budget to military operations. On the other hand, Israeli intelligence has long determined that Qatar uses other channels to secretly finance Hamas’ military wing, an accusation that the Qatari government has denied. A Qatari official echoed that sentiment in a statement: “Any attempt to cast doubt on the humanitarian nature and positive impact of Qatar’s contributions is unfounded.” Several Israeli governments allowed the money to flow into Gaza for humanitarian reasons, not to strengthen Hamas, said an official from Netanyahu’s office in a statement. And he added: “Prime Minister Netanyahu acted to significantly weaken Hamas. He led three powerful military operations against Hamas that killed thousands of terrorists and high-ranking Hamas commanders.” Hamas has always publicly expressed its commitment to eliminating the State of Israel. But each payment was evidence of the Israeli government’s view that Hamas was a low-level nuisance and even a political asset. As early as December 2012, Netanyahu told prominent Israeli journalist Dan Margalit that it was important to keep Hamas strong, as a counterbalance to the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. In an interview, Margalit recounted that Netanyahu had told him that having two strong rivals, including Hamas, would reduce the pressure on him to negotiate toward a Palestinian state. The official from the prime minister’s office said Netanyahu never made this statement. But Netanyahu would present this idea to others over the years. While Israeli military and intelligence leaders have acknowledged the failures that led to the Hamas attack, Netanyahu has refused to address those issues. And with the war in Gaza, the political reckoning for the man who has been prime minister for 13 of the past 15 years is on hold for now. But Netanyahu’s critics say his strategy toward Hamas essentially had a cynical political agenda: to keep Gaza calm as a way to stay in power without addressing the threat from Hamas or the underlying Palestinian discontent. “Netanyahu’s vision for a decade and a half was that if we bought calm and pretended the problem didn’t exist, we could hope it would go away on its own,” said Eyal Hulata, Israel’s national security adviser from July 2021 until earlier this year. Seeking balance Netanyahu and his security advisers gradually began to reconsider their strategy toward the Gaza Strip following several bloody and inconclusive military conflicts there against Hamas. “Everyone was sick and tired of Gaza,” said Zohar Palti, former head of Mossad intelligence. “We all said, ‘Let’s forget about Gaza,’ because we knew it was at a standstill.” After one of the conflicts in 2014, Netanyahu charted a new course: he emphasized a strategy of trying to “contain” Hamas while Israel focused on Iran’s nuclear program and its allied armies, including Hezbollah. This strategy was bolstered by repeated intelligence assessments indicating that Hamas was neither interested in nor capable of launching a significant attack inside Israel. During this period, Qatar became a key financier for reconstruction and government operations in Gaza. Qatar, one of the world’s richest countries, has long championed the Palestinian cause and, of all its neighbors, has cultivated the closest ties with Hamas. These relationships have proven valuable in recent weeks, as Qatari officials helped negotiate the release of Israeli hostages in Gaza. Qatar’s work in Gaza during this period had the blessing of the Israeli government. Netanyahu even lobbied Washington on Qatar’s behalf. In 2017, when Republicans were pressing for financial sanctions on Qatar for its support of Hamas, the Israeli prime minister sent senior intelligence officials to Washington. The Israelis told US lawmakers that Qatar had played a positive role in the Gaza Strip, according to three people familiar with the trip. Yossi Kuperwasser, former head of research for Israeli military intelligence, said some officials saw the benefits of maintaining a “balance” in the Gaza Strip. “Israel’s logic was that Hamas had to be strong enough to govern Gaza,” he said, “but weak enough to be deterred by Israel.” The governments of three US presidents (Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden) widely supported Qatar’s direct role in funding operations in Gaza. But not everyone was in favor. Months after becoming defense minister in 2016, Avigdor Lieberman wrote a secret memo to Netanyahu and the head of the Israeli military. It said Hamas was slowly building its military capabilities to attack Israel and argued that Israel should strike first. The goal for Israel is “to ensure that the next clash between Israel and Hamas is the final showdown,” he wrote in the memo, dated December 21, 2016, and of which the Times reviewed a copy. A preemptive strike, he said, could eliminate most of Hamas’ “military wing leadership.” Netanyahu rejected the plan and preferred the…
